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The Revival of the “Sweeping Clause”: An Analysis of
Why the Supreme Court Had to “Breathe New Life” into the
Necessary and Proper Clause in United States v. Comstock
By Lauren E. Marsh
Introduction

T

he protection of our nation’s children against
the dangers of sex offenders has become a growing concern of our society. Child victims, such as
Adam Walsh, whose death drew national attention
and prompted the creation of “American’s Most Wanted,”1
have increased society’s attention to
sexual offenders. Statistics have demonstrated that one in five girls and one
in ten boys will be sexually exploited
before they reach adulthood, and over
two-thirds of all sexual assault victims
are children.2 Additional research indicates that sex offenses are less likely
to be reported than any other offense,
making it nearly impossible to accurately measure the frequency of these
incidents in any given year.3
Perhaps even more alarming is
the recidivism rate of sex offenders. A
Department of Justice report examining recidivism rates in fifteen states
indicates that 5.3% of male offenders
were rearrested for another sex-related
crime within three years of their prison
release.4 These numbers may fail to
expose the true extent of the problem:
a 2001 report revealed that re-offenses
take place more than twice as often as are officially recorded.5
In response to this discomforting recidivism rate, numerous
states have enacted legislation allowing for the civil commitment of “sexually violent predators,” in hopes of curbing reoffending rates for such offenders.6 In 2006, Congress decided
to follow suit.
Congress passed the Adam Walsh Child Protection and
Safety Act (“Adam Walsh Act” or “the Act”) in July of 2006.7
The Act aimed to create more explicit and uniform registration
requirements for sex offenders and to amend federal law and
procedure regarding the civil commitment of sex offenders. 8
Title III, Section 301 of the Act, 18 U.S.C. § 4248, authorizes
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the Attorney General or the Director of the Bureau of Prisons
to certify a sex offender as “sexually dangerous” and order that
person to be civilly committed to the custody of the Attorney
General.9
This portion of the Adam Walsh Act has been challenged
on the premise that it is an unconstitutional exercise of Congressional authority.10 A number of district courts,11 as well the
First, Fourth and Eighth Circuits,12
were in disagreement as to the Act’s
constitutionality. In June 2009, the
Supreme Court of the United States
granted certiorari to United States v.
Comstock.13 On May 17, 2010, by a
7-2 vote, the Supreme Court reversed
the Fourth Circuit and held that Congress had the constitutional authority
to enact § 4248 under the Necessary
and Proper Clause.14
The Court’s decision drew a lot of
attention; if not for the holding itself,
then at least for the analysis the Court
implemented in reaching its conclusion.15 In every other recent decision
addressing the federal government’s
authority to enact legislation, the Supreme Court has applied an analysis
under the Commerce Clause,16 rather
than the Necessary and Proper Clause
alone, to determine whether the law at
issue was a constitutional exercise of
17
congressional authority. Each of these cases applied a threeprong test created in a 1995 decision, United States v. Lopez,18
establishing that Congress only has the authority under the
Commerce Clause to enact legislation if the act (1) regulates
channels of interstate commerce, (2) regulates instrumentalities
or persons or things within interstate commerce, or (3) substantially effects interstate commerce.19
The basis for relying on the Commerce Clause in these
cases was that the Necessary and Proper Clause, absent a sufficient link to a power expressly granted to Congress in Article I,
did not grant Congress the authority on its own to enact legislation.20 However, the Rehnquist Court’s Commerce Clause juris23

prudence itself created a very narrow standard, greatly limiting
the federal government’s ability to enact legislation through its
commerce power.21 Rather than applying the rigid three-prong
commerce power analysis in Comstock, the Supreme Court created a new five-factor standard,22 concluding that the Necessary
and Proper Clause granted Congress the authority to enact §
4248.23
Regardless of whether this decision, as some have criticized,
is a demonstration of the Court adopting policy over law,24 one
thing is certain: if the Supreme Court wanted to uphold § 4248,
it had no choice but to adopt a new analysis under the Necessary
and Proper Clause in order to do so. This Comment will argue
that, had the Supreme Court treated Comstock as a commerce
power case, the precedent established by the Rehnquist Court
would have prevented it from upholding § 4248. Specifically, it
will demonstrate that § 4248 would not have survived the stringent three-prong Lopez standard, and even in light the Supreme
Court’s arguable expansion of commerce clause in its most recent Commerce Clause decision, Gonzales v. Raich,25 the Court
would not have been able to validate the enactment of § 4248
on Commerce Clause grounds.
Part I of this Comment will provide a background of the
constitutional provisions relevant to the issues presented in
Comstock. Part II will provide a background of the Adam Walsh
Act, § 4248 specifically, challenges to the provision, and a brief
discussion of the Supreme Court’s decision in Comstock. Part
III will demonstrate that in light of the recent Supreme Court decisions that have limited the scope of Congress’ power, the government could not rely on the Commerce Clause to justify the
validity of § 4248, and the Supreme Court had to adopt a new
approach in order to validate the law. Part IV will describe the
five-step approach that the Court decided to take and discuss the
concerns that the concurring and dissenting Justices had with
this framework. Part V will conclude with a brief discussion of
the implications of the Court’s decision.

I. Sources of, and Limitations on, Congress’
Authority to Enact Legislation
Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution presents and defines the depth and breadth of Congressional authority.26 Congress’ powers include the power to lay and collect
taxes, the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and
among the states, the power to coin money, the power to declare
war, and the power to organize and provide for a military.27
Congress also has the authority to enact any law that is “necessary and proper” to execute either its enumerated powers or
any powers the Constitution vests in the United States Government.28 The Tenth Amendment limits the scope of Congressional authority and maintains that the powers not granted to the
24

United States government are reserved “to the states” or “to the
people.”29
This section will first discuss the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause and the constitutional authority that this clause provides Congress. It will then
describe the Supreme Court’s evolving interpretation of the
Commerce Clause,30 and how the Court has expanded, and later
limited, Congress’s power to enact legislation. Finally, it will
address the implications of the Tenth Amendment as applied to
state police powers.

A.	The Necessary and Proper Clause
In McCulloch v. Maryland,31 the Supreme Court established the meaning of the terms “necessary” and “proper” as
interpreted in the Necessary and Proper Clause.32 The Court
held that in this context “necessary” does not imply “an absolute, physical necessity” but simply requires “that one thing is
convenient, or useful, or essential to another.”33 Furthermore,
the Court held that “proper” entails “all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted” to an end that is already
within the realm of Congress’ Constitutional authority.34 The
Court maintained that the term “proper” modifies “necessary,”
and that if the Framers intended strict necessity, it would have
excluded the term “proper” altogether.35 Thus, for a law to be
“necessary and proper” to the execution of powers enumerated
to Congress, it does not have to be “necessary” in an essential or
crucial sense, but rather, must be suitably tailored to the furtherance of a power that is within Congress’ realm of authority.36
In general, Congress must use the Necessary and Proper
Clause in conjunction with another constitutionally-enumerated
power in order to have the authority to enact legislation.37 In
other words, Congress cannot enact legislation simply under
the premise that it is “necessary and proper” on its own; instead,
the legislation must be necessary and proper to the furtherance
of a power that Congress already possesses.38 For example, in
McCulloch v. Maryland, the Court upheld Congress’ establishment of a National Bank, deeming it “necessary and proper”
to the execution of Congress’ powers to lay and collect taxes,
coin and borrow money, regulate commerce, conduct war, and
to raise and support an army and a navy.39 The Necessary and
Proper clause serves as an “adjunct” to Congressional authority
rather than an independent source of power.40

B.	The Commerce Clause
Congress often invokes its authority under the Commerce
Clause in order to enact legislation.41 The Commerce Clause
grants Congress the authority to regulate commerce “with foreign nations, and among the states, and with the Indian Tribes.”42
In the Supreme Court’s landmark Commerce Clause case, Gibbons v. Ogden,43 Chief Justice John Marshall established that
“commerce amongst the states” entails commerce that interminSpring 2010

gles between states, but does not extend to commerce that stays
strictly with the internal boundaries of one state.44
Between Gibbons and the New Deal,45 the Court continued
to refine its definition of Congress’ commerce power through
a number of cases. In United States v. E.C. Knight, Co.,46 the
Court overturned a provision of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act that
made illegal “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust
or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several states.”47 The Court reasoned that the enactment was not within Congress’ constitutional authority because
it only affected commerce “indirectly” and “incidentally.”48
However, after E.C. Knight, the Court began to expand
its definition of interstate commerce. In the Shreveport Rate
Case,49 the Court held that Congressional authority over the regulation of interstate commerce extends to interstate
“carriers” that serve as “instruments of
interstate commerce.”50 In Swift & Co.
v. United States,51 the Court held that
when the target of Congress’ regulation will enter the stream of interstate
commerce, Congress has the authority
to regulate activity related to that target, even if such regulation only occurs
within one state.52
This expansion of Commerce
Power came to a sudden halt during the
New Deal, when the Court overturned a
number of legislative acts, maintaining that a bright-line distinction existed between manufacturing and commerce.53 However,
almost as quickly as the Court began overturning New Deal
legislation, it turned a new course and abandoned the distinction between manufacturing and commerce in NLRB v. Jones
& Laughlin Steel Co.54 In this case, the Court upheld the National Labor Relations Act, reasoning that the intrastate activity
that it regulated had a “close and substantial relation” to interstate commerce.55 Furthermore, in United States v. Darby,56 the
Court established that Congress has the power to regulate any
intrastate activities that are “so commingled with or related to”
interstate commerce that the regulation of interstate commerce
requires the regulation of these activities.57 In Wickard v. Filburn,58 the Court held that Congress’ authority to regulate may
even reach entirely local activity if the aggregate effect of such
activity has a “substantial effect” on interstate commerce.59
For about fifty years Congress had seemingly free reign
to enact legislation invoking its authority under the Commerce
Clause.60 However, the expansion of Commerce authority came
to an end in 1995 when the Rehnquist Court decided United
States v. Lopez,61 a case challenging Congress’ constitutional authority to enact the Gun-Free School Zone Act (GFSZA) under
the Commerce Clause.62 The Court held that the act “exceed[ed]

the authority of Congress,” as it “neither regulate[d] a commercial activity nor contain[ed] a requirement that the possession be
connected in any way to interstate commerce.”63
Chief Justice Rehnquist identified three types of activities
Congress may regulate under the commerce clause.64 Under the
Lopez test, Congress may regulate (1) “channels” of interstate
commerce,65 (2) “instrumentalities,” or persons or things in interstate commerce,66 and (3) activities that “substantially affect”
interstate commerce.67
The Court quickly determined that the Gun Free School
Zones Act was neither a channel nor an instrumentality of interstate commerce.68 It, however, went into more detail when addressing the third prong, recognizing that the law “has not been
clear” on the type of activities that may
“substantially affect” interstate commerce.69 The Court held that either the
target of the regulation must be a commercial activity or the activity must be
an “essential part of a larger regulation
of economic activity.”70 In analyzing
the Gun Free School Zones Act under
this third prong, the Court ultimately
found three shortcomings: that it was a
“criminal statute that by its terms ha[d]
nothing to do with ‘commerce,’” that it
“contain[ed] no jurisdictional element”
that could “ensure” that it affected interstate commerce, and that it did not contain any “express congressional findings” as to the effect the
law had on interstate commerce.71 The Court ultimately overturned the Act under the “substantial effects” prong, asserting
that ruling otherwise would require the Court to “pile inference
upon inference” in such a way that would ultimately give Congress having a “general police power of the sort retained by the
States”—something that it was “unwilling to do.”72
The Rehnquist Court applied Lopez again five years later.
In United States v. Morrison,73 the Court struck down a provision of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) that provided that offenders of gender-motivated sexual violence could
be held civilly liable for damages against the person they injured.74 In Morrison, the Court emphasized that its decision in
Lopez relied on the fact that the targeted activity was of “noneconomic, criminal nature” and that the link between possessing
a gun and its “substantial effect on interstate commerce was
attenuated.”75 Contrary to the case in Lopez, the government in
Morrison put forth findings in support of their argument that
gender-motivated violence has an impact on interstate commerce.76 Nonetheless, the Court still overturned this provision
of the Act, reasoning that such findings were “weakened by the
fact that they rel[ied] so heavily on a method of reasoning” that
the Court had already deemed “unworkable.”77

For about fifty years

Congress had seemingly
free reign to enact

legislation invoking

its authority under the
Commerce Clause.
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As with the statute at issue in Lopez, the Court in Morrison expressed concern that accepting the government’s argument would “obliterate the Constitution’s distinction between
national and local authority.”78 The Court found the same shortcomings in this provision of the Violence Against Women Act,
and accordingly, found the provision to be an unconstitutional
exercise of Congress’ authority.79 In doing so, the Court demonstrated its commitment to maintaining a distinction between
violence that impacts interstate commerce, and violence that is
entirely intra-state and meant to be within “the province of the
states.”80
Though the Rehnquist Court indicated that Congress did
not have unlimited authority to enact legislation,81 it took a new
direction soon after in Gonzales v. Raich,82 upholding a regulation that, as it was applied, did not have a direct connection to
interstate commerce.83 In a 6-3 decision, the Court upheld the
Controlled Substances Act (CSA), which “[made] it unlawful
to manufacture, distribute, dispense, or possess any controlled
substance,” except as allowed by the Act itself.84 The respondents did not challenge the constitutionality of the Act on its
face but rather asserted that the law’s “prohibition of the manufacture and possession of marijuana,” as applied to their use
of it for medicinal purposes, exceeded Congress’ Commerce
Clause authority.85
In upholding the CSA, the Court likened this case to Wickard, reasoning that “failure to regulate” the controlled substance
market, even for home consumption, would “affect price and
market conditions.”86 Ultimately, because the CSA regulated
activities that were “quintessentially economic,” and affected
the “production, distribution, and consumption of commodities,” the Court concluded that Congress had acted within its
authority in enacting the CSA.87
Justice Scalia authored a concurring opinion in Raich, asserting that he had a more “nuanced” understanding of the “doctrinal foundation” on which the Court’s holding should rest.88
Unlike the majority, Justice Scalia relied on the Necessary and
Proper Clause as the constitutional source of Congress’ authority to regulate the home consumption of marijuana.89 In doing
so, he recognized that the objective of the CSA was to “extinguish the interstate market in Schedule I controlled substances,
including marijuana,” and insisted Congress’ authority to enact
a prohibition of intrastate consumption of marijuana depended
on whether it was an “appropriate means of achieving the legitimate end of [eliminating] Schedule I substances from interstate
commerce.”90 In finding that the CSA was, in fact, an appropriate means of obtaining Congress’ objective, Scalia agreed with
the Court majority that the regulation should be sustained.91
Raich was the last major Commerce Clause case that the
Court has decided. By upholding legislation that, at least in that
instance, regulated wholly intrastate activity, Raich has arguably departed from Chief Justice Rehnquist’s original limita26

tions on commerce power. As a result, the Court made it unclear
whether Raich marked a departure from the Lopez framework
altogether or rather provides an example of an intrastate activity that survives Lopez’s “substantially affects” test.92 Moving
forward, it was unclear whether Raich will be recognized as the
direction the Court would take in the future or whether the Court
will continue to apply Lopez’s three-part framework when issues of congressional authority arose.93

C.	The Tenth Amendment and the “Powers
	Reserved to the States”
The Tenth Amendment of the United States Constitution
states that “the powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people.”94 The Supreme Court has
read this amendment to imply that any power not conferred to the
federal legislative branch was intended to be left to the states.95
Included in these powers is the state police power—the power to
regulate the internal matters of a state, including, for example, the
power to enact “[i]nspection laws, quarantine laws, [and] health
laws,” as well as the “power of a State to regulate its police, its
domestic trade, and to govern its own citizens.”96 The Supreme
Court has read into the Tenth Amendment that, coinciding with
Article I’s exclusion of a general federal police power, the framers intended to reserve police powers for the states to regulate.97
The Court thus recognizes that the Constitution intended to “withhold[] from Congress a plenary police power” and that legislation
that cuts into this power without the support of one of Congress’
enumerated powers is unconstitutional.98

II. The Adam Walsh Act and the Circuit
Split Created Over § 4248
A.	Description of the Act and its Civil
	Commitment Provision
Congress enacted the Adam Walsh Child Protection and
Safety Act99 (Adam Walsh Act) in 2006.100 The Adam Walsh
Act aimed to create more stringent and uniform requirements
for sex offenders, new definitions and classifications of sex offenders, and a civil commitment program for those offenders
that are deemed to pose a threat of committing sexually violent
crimes in the future.101 Title III of the Act, 18 U.S.C. § 4248,
authorizes the Attorney General, or any person authorized by
the Attorney General or the Bureau of Prisons (BOP), to certify
a person who (1) is in custody of the Bureau of Prisons, (2) is
in the custody of the Attorney General as a result of his or her
incompetence to stand trial, or (3) has had all criminal charges
dropped for mental health reasons, as a “sexually dangerous
person.”102
Spring 2010

As defined by the Adam Walsh Act, a “sexually dangerous
person” is a person who “has engaged or attempted to engage in
sexually violent conduct or child molestation and who is sexually dangerous to others” or a person who “suffers from serious
mental illness, abnormality, or disorder as a result of which he
would have serious difficulty in refraining from sexually violent
conduct or child molestation.”103 Upon certifying a person as
“sexually dangerous,” the Attorney General or Director of the
BOP must transmit the certification to the clerk of the court of
the district in which that person is confined.104
Under the Act, if the district court determines based on
clear and convincing evidence that the person is “sexually dangerous,” it shall then commit that person to the custody of the
Attorney General.105 The Attorney General then must attempt to
release that person to an official of the State of that individual’s
domicile, if the state chooses to assume responsibility for the
individual’s “custody, care, and treatment.”106 However, if the
state does not assume responsibility for the individual, the Attorney General shall then place the person in a treatment facility
until (1) the state chooses to assume responsibility, or (2) the
person’s condition improves so that he is no longer sexually
dangerous if released and prescribed medical, psychiatric, or
psychological treatment.107
Although numerous states have implemented legislation
providing for the civil commitment of sexually violent predators,108 § 4248 is the first federal provision calling for a federal
program to civilly commit sexually dangerous persons.109 Unlike
many of these state provisions, § 4248 allows for the civil commitment of any federal sex offender, regardless of the severity
of the crime or his likelihood to re-commit.110 The government
can have an offender civilly committed after he has completed
his prison sentence, and may wait until the person’s sentence
has expired to determine the risk he poses.111 This makes § 4248
different from other federal civil commitment programs, which
generally call for civil commitment prior to court proceedings
or sentence completion.112

B.	Challenges to § 4248
Petitioners across the country have challenged this civil
commitment provision of the Adam Walsh Act in federal court,
and circuits had split on the question of whether Congress had
the constitutional authority to enact this portion of the legislation. In United States v. Comstock,113 the Fourth Circuit invalidated § 4248 and held that neither the Commerce Clause nor
the Necessary and Proper clause conferred upon Congress the
authority to enact this civil commitment provision.114 The court
found that § 4248 did not target channels of interstate commerce
or persons or things in interstate commerce.115 Moreover, it held
that target of the § 4248, “sexual dangerousness,” does not substantially affect interstate commerce.116
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The court also rejected the government’s argument that
§ 4248 is necessary and proper to the government’s ability to
“establish and maintain” the federal criminal justice and penal
systems and to its authority to prevent “sex-related crimes,” and
that § 4248 fit squarely with the government’s power to prosecute under the Necessary and Proper Clause.117 Emphasizing
that the Necessary and Proper Clause merely allows Congress to
enact laws that are necessary to the execution powers vested by
the Constitution, the Fourth Circuit held that the constitutional
provision, on its own, “creates no constitutional power.”118 Furthermore, the court emphasized that control over the mentally
ill is a police power that is generally reserved to the states.119
Although the Fourth Circuit invalidated § 4248, the Eighth
Circuit upheld this provision of the Adam Walsh Act several
months later in United States v. Tom.120 As in Comstock, the
Eighth Circuit in Tom acknowledged that Congress did not
identify the source of its authority to enact § 4248.121 Nonetheless, the Eighth Circuit found that Congress had the “ancillary authority” under the Necessary and Proper Clause to enact
§ 4248; this provision aimed to prevent the commission of
sex offenses for which Congress did possess the authority to
enact.122 In other words, the court reasoned that because the prisoners affected by § 4248 were incarcerated pursuant to federal
sex offense statutes for which Congress had the constitutional
authority to enact, § 4248 was a “rational and appropriate,” and
thus necessary and proper, means of effectuating federal sex
crime legislation.123
While the Fourth Circuit relied heavily on the Supreme
Court’s commerce power analyses in Lopez and Morrison to
invalidate § 4248, the Eight Circuit in Tom applied Justice
Scalia’s concurring opinion in Raich.124 In applying this rationale, the Eighth Circuit concluded that Congress can regulate
intrastate activities that do not substantially affect interstate
commerce when such regulation is necessary to make its regulation of interstate commerce, as a whole, effective.125 The court
maintained that prior commission of a sexually violent crime
was indicative of one’s “propensity” to engage in other federally prohibited sexual conduct in the future.126 Because § 4248
aimed to prevent the further commission of federal crime, the
court therefore viewed this potential crime prevention as a necessary means to make federal sex offense laws effective.127
Several months after Tom, the First Circuit also concluded
that § 4248 was not an unconstitutional exercise of Congressional authority.128 In United States v. Volungus, the First Circuit
relied heavily on an earlier Supreme Court decision, Greenwood
v. United States,129 to conclude that § 4248 was “within the
scope of Congress’s constitutional authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause.”130 In Greenwood, the Supreme Court
held that Congress had the authority to enact a similar provision
that granted the federal government the authority to civilly commit individuals that were found to be incompetent to stand trial
27

due to their mental illness.131 Because the Supreme Court found
that Congress had the “auxiliary” authority to enact that provision in Greenwood, the First Circuit determined that Congress
similarly had such authority to enact § 4248 in Volungus.132
Although only three circuits have addressed the constitutionality of § 4248, this issue has created a divide among district courts throughout the nation.133 Districts addressing § 4248
have upheld the provision, finding Congressional authority
in the Necessary and Proper and Commerce Clauses to enact
this provision.134 However, several district courts have adopted
arguments similar to those of the Fourth Circuit in Comstock,
finding § 4248 invalid.135 The decisions in Comstock and Tom
created a circuit split over the constitutionality of § 4248. The
Supreme Court resolved this split in the current term, holding
that the Necessary and Proper Clause granted Congress the authority to enact § 4248.136

III. The Supreme Court had to create a new
standard in Comstock to uphold § 4248
because the Act would not have survived an
analysis under the Lopez test, and because the
Court had only established limited precedent
using the Necessary and Proper Clause as
a stand-alone to enact legislation.
In light of the Supreme Court’s reliance on the implementation of a commerce power analysis
in other recent federalism cases, it
would not have been unreasonable to assume that, in order to remain consistent with the Rehnquist
Court’s approach, the Roberts Court
would have applied the three-part
framework created in Lopez, and
applied in Morrison and Raich, to
reach a decision in Comstock. However, had the Court done so, § 4248
would have been doomed; the Court
simply could not have found § 4248
to be Constitutional under a Commerce Clause analysis without departing from the stringent Lopez
framework. Moreover, simply turning to precedent addressing
the scope of the Necessary and Proper Clause, on its own, would
not have yielded the Court a sufficient basis uphold the validity of
§ 4248.
This section will argue that the Court had no choice but to
create a new standard in order to justify its decision that § 4248
was a constitutional exercise of Congressional authority. First,
it will demonstrate that the Commerce Clause did not provide
Congress with sufficient authority to enact this provision under

the Lopez test, and, even if the Court had analyzed the provision
under the arguably less stringent standard created in Raich, it
would not have been able to find that § 4248 “substantially affects” interstate commerce. Next, this section will explain why
Necessary and Proper jurisprudence that was established prior
to Comstock did not provide a sufficient basis for the Court to
justify upholding § 4248, and that, consequently, the Court had
to refine its Necessary and Proper Clause analysis by creating
its new five-part standard.

A.	In applying the three-prong test
implemented in Lopez and Morrison,
	Congress did not have the authority under
the Commerce Clause to enact § 4248.
While the government relied heavily on the Commerce
Clause in the earlier stages of litigation to justify the enactment
of § 4248,137 it is an argument that it discarded once Comstock
reached the high Court.138 The government abandoned this
argument with good reason: had it relied solely on the Commerce Clause, it would have presented the Court with a losing
argument.
This subsection will argue that, regardless of which Commerce Clause standard the Court would have applied, the
government’s Commerce Clause argument would not have prevailed in United States v. Comstock. First, it will demonstrate
that although Raich was the Court’s most recent Commerce
Clause decision, it would have been more appropriate for the
Court to apply the three-prong test
established in Lopez to determine
whether Congress had the authority
to enact § 4248. It will then demonstrate that § 4248 would not have
survived any of the three prongs of
the Lopez test. Finally, it will show
that, even if the Court had chosen
to apply Raich, rather than Lopez,
as the commerce power standard,
the law still would not have passed
constitutional muster, as it does not
regulate activities that are “quintessentially economic” in nature.139

had it [the government]
relied solely on the

Commerce Clause, it would
have presented the Court
with a losing argument.
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i. Lopez and Morrison, rather than Raich,
would have been controlling in United States
v. Comstock.
As discussed above, Congress enjoyed half a century of essentially unlimited power under the Court’s Commerce Clause
interpretation until the Rehnquist Court halted its expansion in
the mid-nineties in Lopez, and reaffirmed its commitment to
strengthening federalism in Morrison.140 Raich, however, raised
speculation as to how far the Supreme Court was willing to
Spring 2010

go in maintaining a divide between what the federal government has the authority to regulate and what should be left to
the states.141 As Raich was the Supreme Court’s most recent
Commerce Clause case, one might expect that the Court would
have turned to this decision for guidance if it had applied a
Commerce Clause analysis to § 4248. When the ruling in Raich
emerged, many scholars believed that this decision marked the
end of the Rehnquist’s federalism expansion.142 However, many
scholars have suggested, and this comment asserts, that Raich
merely demonstrates one circumstance in which the Court
found it plausible to reconcile the regulation of wholly intrastate
activity with the limitations that the Commerce Clause imposes
on Congress’ authority to enact legislation.143 Accordingly,
this subsection will demonstrate why the Lopez and Morrison
framework would have been the more appropriate standard to
apply to § 4248.
Raich is distinguishable from these other Rehnquist Court
decisions in at least three respects. First, unlike Lopez and Morrison, Raich involved an “as-applied” challenge to an Act that,
on its face, was a valid exercise of Congressional authority.144
Unlike the petitioners in Lopez and Morrison, who contended
that the Acts in question fell outside the scope of Congressional
authority altogether,145 the respondents in Raich merely challenged the Controlled Substances Act as it applied to their personal, intrastate consumption of marijuana.146 The Court referred
to this distinction between Raich and the previous cases as “pivotal” to its decision, asserting that where a regulated class of
activities is “within the reach of federal power,” courts cannot
“excise, as trivial, individual instances of the class.”147 Because
Comstock was a facial challenge to a statute, as opposed to an
as-applied to challenge to an otherwise valid statute,148 this case
would have warranted an analysis under the Lopez standard.149
Second, the more stringent Lopez standard would have
been the more appropriate test to apply, given the similarities
between § 4248 and the laws at issue in Lopez150 and Morrison.151 Both the Gun-Free School Zone Act (GFSZA) and the
Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) took on the role of a
police power—a power that is generally left to the states to regulate.152 Because both Acts aimed to control the behavior of individuals within a state,153 neither act demonstrated any specific
attachment to the regulation of interstate commerce.154 The Supreme Court has recognized such infringement on state police
powers as grounds for overturning congressional statutes when
such statutes have no connection to interstate commerce.155
On the other hand, the Controlled Substances Act, which
was at issue in Raich, was a “comprehensive regulatory statute”
that regulated the “production, distribution, and possession” of
a substance for which there was a substantial (although illegal)
market.156 In its decision in Raich, the Supreme Court emphasized the idea that the activities that CSA regulated, unlike those
regulated by the GFSZA and the VAWA, were “commercial”
Criminal Law Brief

and “quintessentially economic.”157 Although the activities of
the respondents’ in Raich remained entirely within the confines
of the state of California, the Court concluded that Congress had
a “rational basis” for concluding that the respondents’ consumption of marijuana, “taken in the aggregate,” had the potential of
“substantially affect[ing]” interstate commerce.158
Of the legislation challenged in the three most recent Commerce Clause decisions, § 4248 more closely resembles the
legislation at issue in Lopez and Morrison than the regulation
challenged in Raich. As in Lopez and Morrison, the Court in
Comstock addressed the constitutionality of an act that is “noneconomic” and “criminal” in nature.159 The VAWA provision
at issue in Morrison sought to regulate individual acts of sexual
violence against women generally;160 the GFSZA at issue in
Lopez aimed to regulate the conduct of individuals who might
possess a gun while in a school zone.161 Similar to these laws,
§ 4248 aims to regulate the individual acts of sexually violent
predators by preventing their release into the public until they
are no longer deemed to be a threat to the safety of others.162
Third, unlike the Controlled Substances Act, and much like
the VAWA and the GFSZA, § 4248 does not target activity
that is part of “comprehensive regulatory regime” which aims to
control activities that are “quintessentially economic.”163 Raich
applied an “aggregate effects” test due to the CSA’s relation
to the “production, distribution, and consumption of commodities.”164 Just as the “non-economic nature” of the VAWA provision and the GFSZA played an essential role in the Court’s
decision, so too would the non-economic nature of § 4248 have
had a bearing in Comstock. Because § 4248 is lacking this economic tie, which was the key element in the Raich, the standard
developed in Raich would not have been appropriate to apply
in Comstock.

ii. If the Court had applied the three-part
framework established in Lopez, the Court
would not have found that the Commerce Clause
granted Congress the authority to enact § 4248.
Assuming that the Court would have used Lopez as its
guidepost, it would have applied the cases’ three-part test to
determine whether Congress had the authority to enact § 4248.
In doing so, the Court would have found that § 4248 does not
survive any of the tests three prongs, as it does not, (1) regulate
the “channels” of interstate commerce, (2) regulate “instrumentalities” or persons or things within interstate commerce, or (3)
have a substantial affect on interstate commerce as established
in the Court’s recent commerce clause jurisprudence.165
As was the case in Lopez, the Court in Comstock would
have quickly recognized that § 4248 does not satisfy the first
prong of the Lopez test.166 It is evident here that § 4248 does
not regulate “channels” of interstate commerce, as the term
“channels” refers to the means through which items in interstate
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commerce might travel—such as a river or a roadway.167 Section 4248, to the contrary, aims to regulate the placement and
behavior of people, and the actions that the government and the
Bureau of Prisons may take in order to ensure that these people
do not pose a danger to others.168
Furthermore, the Supreme Court would have found that §
4248 does not regulate “instrumentalities” of interstate commerce, nor necessarily persons or things within interstate
commerce, just as it did in Lopez and Morrison.169 The term
“instrumentalities,” as applied to interstate commerce, refers to
the types of mechanisms that might be used in order to ship
or move goods throughout interstate commerce.170 Again, §
4248 aims to regulate people—rather than things—and it does
not require that the people it regulates have any connection to
interstate commerce.171 Thus, the only way that § 4248 would
have survived under the Lopez test would have been if the Court
found that it otherwise has a substantial effect on interstate commerce.172
Section 4248 would not have survived this third and final
prong of the Lopez test. Like the Gun-Free School Zones Act
and the Violence Against Women Act, the link between § 4248
and interstate commerce is, at best, “attenuated.”173 As the Supreme Court in Morrison observed, in the cases in which the
Court upheld federal legislation that regulated intrastate activity based on its “substantial effects on interstate commerce,” it
did so because “the activity in question has been some sort of
economic endeavor.”174 Like the provisions in Lopez and Morrison, § 4248 is a criminal statute, aiming to regulate offenders
of violent crimes, and having no relation to commerce or the
economic market.175
The Court would have recognized many of the same shortcomings of § 4248 that recognized the GFSZA and the VAWA
provision to be lacking. The Court rejected the government’s
argument in Lopez in large part because it did not provide any
findings regarding the effect that gun possession in a school
zone would have on interstate commerce.176 As was the case in
Lopez, Congress purported no findings as to the link between §
4248 and interstate commerce in several of the cases that challenged the Act’s constitutionality.177 However, as demonstrated
in Morrison, even the effects of such findings may not salvage a
law that targets sexually violent crimes when, on its face, it has
no direct tie to interstate commerce.178
Furthermore, the concern the Court had in Morrison was
one that may very well have come into play in Comstock: that
if it were to accept the government’s argument regarding the
law’s relation to interstate commerce, such a decision would
allow Congress to regulate essentially any crime under the guise
of its commerce power.179 The aim of Lopez and Morrison, was
to put an end to Congress’ free reign in enacting legislation by
claiming such legislation regulated interstate commerce.180 If
the Court were to find that § 4248’s civil commitment provision
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substantially affected interstate commerce, it would give Congress a whole new opportunity to assert its commerce power in
ways that the Court deemed inappropriate in Lopez and Morrison.181 While the decision in Comstock certainly opened new
doors through which Congress could regulate, the Court decided this case in a way that left intact the limitations that the
Rehnquist Court placed on Congress’ commerce power.182

iii. Even if the Court did apply Raich in United
States v. Comstock, it would still have found
that § 4248 falls outside the scope of
congressional authority.
Assuming, arguendo, that the Court did find that Raich
would have been controlling in Comstock, it would nonetheless
have found that the Commerce Clause did not grant Congress
the authority to enact § 4248. Essential to the Court’s holding in
Raich was that the CSA regulated the “production, distribution,
and consumption of commodities,” and thus, that the activities
it regulated were “quintessentially economic” in nature.183 Thus,
even if the Court were to apply this “aggregate effects” test,
rather than Lopez’s “substantially effects” test, it would have
been quick to find that § 4248 does not aim to regulate any aspect of the market or activities that are in any way economic in
nature.184 Section 4248 is a regulation aimed at preventing noneconomic violence,185 and as such, could not possibly have the
effect of altering the market in such a way that the Court found
the CSA would in Raich.186
Even the Court’s adoption of Justice Scalia’s concurring
opinion in Raich would have placed § 4248 outside the realm of
congressional authority.187 In his opinion, Justice Scalia asserted
that Congress’ power to regulate activities that substantially affect interstate commerce “cannot come from the Commerce
Clause alone.”188 Instead, Justice Scalia insisted that Congress’
authority over the regulation of intrastate activities extends to
“even noneconomic local activity” in order to “take all measures necessary or appropriate to the effective regulation of the
interstate market.”189 However, even Justice Scalia emphasized
the close tie the respondents’ home-consumption of marijuana
had to the interstate market, sharing the majority’s concern that
their use of the drug could “undercut” the interstate market.190
Section 4248 lacks such ties. Thus, even if the Court had adopted Justice Scalia’s reasoning in Comstock, § 4248 would not
have survived under a commerce power argument.191
In short, regardless of whether and how the Court applied
Lopez or Raich as controlling law, it would have reached the
conclusion that the Commerce Clause did not grant Congress
the authority to enact § 4248. Apparently recognizing the shortcomings of applying a commerce power analysis to § 4248, the
Court was clearly determined to find an alternate route to validate this provision. The Necessary and Proper Clause provided
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the Court with this route, but the Court still had to create its own
path to reach its conclusion.

B.	Nothing in Supreme Court precedent
prior to Comstock would suggest that
the Necessary and Proper Clause, as a
standalone, granted Congress the
authority to enact § 4248.
Although the Supreme Court ultimately relied on the Necessary and Proper Clause to reach the conclusion that Congress
had the authority to enact § 4248, it had to create a new standard,
rather than rely on precedent, in
order to do so. Nothing in Supreme
Court precedent suggested that this
provision could stand on its own
without a direct link to an enumerated power of Congress, given that
the Necessary and Proper Clause
only explicitly grants Congress the
authority to enact legislation that
is necessary and proper to a power
enumerated in the Constitution.192
In fact, the Fourth Circuit pointed
out that the government failed to
cite any precedent that directly supported its argument that § 4248 is a
necessary and a proper exercise of
its power to run a federal penal system,193 and each of the district courts
that upheld § 4248 heavily relied on
the decisions of various circuits of the United States Courts of
Appeals, rather than citing Supreme Court precedent.194 This is
because the government could not directly point to a specific
enumerated power that § 4248 served to execute.195
Although precedent on the issue of Necessary and Proper
authority was sparse, the government did have one Supreme
Court case strongly on its side. Greenwood v. United States
was the only Supreme Court decision any of the federal courts
have cited when upholding § 4248 on Necessary and Proper
grounds.196 In Greenwood, the Supreme Court upheld 18 U.S.C.
§4246, a provision that allowed for the civil commitment of federal defendants found incompetent to stand trial, and who posed
a threat of danger to the community or to themselves if released
back into the public.197 The Court found the statute necessary
and proper because the defendant was under the legal custody of
the United States and the federal government’s power to prosecute had not been exhausted.198
However, Greenwood alone could not be relied on to uphold the constitutionality of § 4248. The scope of § 4248 is
broader than was that of § 4246, and, moreover, the decision in
Greenwood was intended to be a narrow one.199 In Greenwood,

the Court recognized that the legislature narrowly tailored §
4246 to only apply to individuals in the legal custody of the
United States who had been charged with a federal crime but
had not yet been tried for that crime.200 Comparatively, section
4248 applies to any individual in custody of the Attorney General who has been found incompetent to stand trial, any individual in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons, and any individual
who had their charges dismissed for reasons concerning their
lack of mental competency.201 The statute in Greenwood only
permitted the federal government to civilly commit offenders
before the completion of their trial; Section § 4248 allows the
government to civilly commit offenders before or after criminal their
proceedings.202 Because § 4248 can
apply to anyone in legal custody of
the United States, 203 the reach of §
4248 goes beyond the government’s
power to prosecute, and reaches into
the point where this power has been
exhausted.204
Moreover, § 4248 is more of
a proactive provision than a reactive one, in essence giving Congress the authority to civilly commit
those who may commit state offenses, rather than simply federal offenses.205 As opposed to the statute
at issue in Greenwood, § 4248 aims
to prevent the future commission of
crime rather than to simply retain
those who have already been accused of committing one.206 In
doing so, the provision makes no distinction between aiming to
prevent the commission of federal crimes, and those actions prohibited by state law.207 This again demonstrates that the § 4248
has a broader reach than did the law at issue in Greenwood.
For all these reasons, Greenwood did not provide sufficient
support for the proposition that § 4248 was a constitutional
exercise of Congressional authority. While it provided useful
guidance,208 the Court had to take its analysis beyond this precedent to reach the conclusion that § 4248 was valid.
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IV. Rather than relying on the Commerce
Clause to validate § 4248, the Court created
a new standard under the Necessary and Proper
Clause to uphold the validity of the law,
creating a new avenue for Congress to justify
its enactment of sweeping legislation.
Giving the Commerce Clause only very short shrift, the
Supreme Court turned to the Necessary and Proper Clause to
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justify the validity of § 4248 in United States v. Comstock. In his
majority opinion, Justice Breyer took five factors into account
to reach the conclusion that Congress had the authority to enact
§ 4248 as “necessary and proper for carrying into execution the
powers vested by the Constitution in the Government of the
United States.”209 These factors included: (1) “the breadth of the
Necessary and Proper Clause”; (2) the “long history of federal
involvement” in the arena of civilly committing the mentally
ill; (3) the “sound reasons” for the enactment of § 4248 in light
of the federal government’s “custodial interest in safeguarding
the public from dangers posed by those in federal custody”; (4)
the fact that the statute took into account, and accommodated
for, state interests; and (5) the narrow scope of § 4248.210 Without providing further explanation or guidance as to the weight
each of these factors must hold, or whether all of these factors
must be satisfied in order for an act of Congress to suffice as
necessary and proper, the majority simply established that in
considering these five factors “taken together,” the necessary
and proper clause provided the federal government with a sufficient basis to enact § 4248.211
The first consideration the majority opinion addressed was
the “broad authority” that the Necessary and Proper Clause
grants Congress to enact federal legislation.212 Justice Breyer
emphasized that while the Federal Government is a government
“of enumerated powers” and that every law it enacts must “be
based on one or more of those powers,” the government must
be provided “ample means” for the execution of these powers.213
He further asserted that the Court had already made clear that
in determining whether the Necessary and Proper Clause grants
Congress the legislative authority to enact any particular statute,
it looks to “see whether the statute constitutes a means that is
rationally related to the implementation of a constitutionally
enumerated power” or “reasonably adapted” to the attainment
of such a power.214 While the Court’s majority did not speak
directly to which specific enumerated power § 4248 was rationally to, it concluded that just as the federal government has
the power to criminalize conduct, erect prisons, and ensure the
safety of the prison system under the guise of the Necessary and
Proper Clause, it has the “broad authority” to enact civil commitment provisions such as that contained in § 4248.215
Second, the majority justified the validity of § 4248 under
the Necessary and Proper Clause because it considered the
provision a “modest addition to a set of prison-related mentalhealth statutes that have existed for many decades.”216 The Court
traced the history of such provisions back to the mid-Nineteenth
Century, demonstrating Congress’ long involvement in the
mental health care of its federal prisoners.217 By the late 19th
Century, the federal government had the authority to provide
for civil commitment of anyone in a federal facility who had
become “insane during the term of their imprisonment,” as well
as those who had simply been charged with federal offenses that
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were in the custody of the United States.218 In 1948 and 1949,
under the direction of the Judicial Conference of the United
States, Congress enacted legislation providing for the civil commitment of individuals who are or become mentally ill at any
point between their arrest and the expiration of their sentence,
and even authorized the commitment of those whose sentences
were about to expire if that individual’s release would “probably endanger the safety . . . interests of the United States.”219
Congress further modified these statutes in 1984, clarifying that
civil commitment was authorized if the release of the prisoner
would “create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious damage to the property of another.”220 The Court
considered this history to be a relevant factor in determining
that Congress had the authority to enact § 4248, as it differs
from these earlier statutes only in that it focuses on persons who
are sexually dangerous due to mental illness.221
The third factor the Court considered was whether it was
reasonable for the federal government to extend its “longstanding civil-commitment system” to cover individuals in federal
custody, even if it would result in detaining them beyond the
expiration of their sentence.222 The Court emphasized the role of
the federal government as the “custodian” of federal prisoners,
and the common law duty of a custodian to “exercise reasonable care to control” the person in its care from causing “bodily
harm to others.”223 Justice Breyer analogized this situation to
one in which a federal prisoner is infected with a communicable
disease that would spread to others if the government were to
release him.224 Certainly, he insisted, if the federal government
can take action pursuant to the Necessary and Proper Clause
to stay the release of such a person for the general welfare of
the public, so too could the government stay the release of an
individual whose mental illness poses a threat to the well-being
of the general public.225 Ultimately, the Court found that § 4248
was “reasonably adapted” to the power of the federal government to act as a responsible federal custodian given the “high
danger” inmates suffering from mental illness could cause to the
public if they were released, especially in light of the low likelihood of states taking custody of such individuals upon their
release.226
Next, the Court addressed another pressing concern that §
4248 raised: the potential infringement it imposes on the sovereignty of the states.227 The Court rejected the notion that § 4248
violated the rights of the states for two reasons. First, the Justice
Breyer maintained that although the Tenth Amendment reserves
powers not delegated to the United States through the Constitution are “reserved to the States,” the powers delegated to the
United States include those powers granted to the federal government through the Necessary and Proper Clause.228 Second,
he asserted that § 4248 does not impede on state sovereignty,
because the statute in fact aims to accommodate state interests
by requiring the Attorney General to inform the state in which
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the prisoner was tried or domiciled that he intends to continue
to detain the prisoner, and to encourage that state to assume
the custody of that individual.229 If the state chooses to assume
responsibility of that individual, the federal government must
hand responsibility over to the state immediately.230 This willingness to accommodate state interests was therefore another
factor the Court took into account in determining that Congress
had the authority to enact § 4248.
Finally, the Court concluded that the connection between §
4248 and a power enumerated in Article I was “not too attenuated,” and that the provision itself was not “too sweeping” in
scope to be justified under the Necessary and Proper Clause.231
In reaching this conclusion, the majority rejected the notion that
federal legislation can only be justified under the Necessary and
Proper Clause if it is “no more than one step removed” from an
enumerated power.232 It explained that the power to punish is
an implied (rather than expressly granted) power, and that the
Court has already inferred from that implied power the power
to imprison as well as the power to civilly commit prisoners.233
While conceding that it could not point to a single specific enumerated power that grants Congress the authority to arrest or
convict a criminal, the Court asserted same enumerated power
that gives Congress this authority further justifies its ability to
create a civil commitment program for such criminals.234
Justice Kennedy took a slightly narrower approach than the
majority to reach the conclusion that § 4248 was a constitutional
exercise of Congressional authority. Emphasizing the importance of the “strength of the chain” that connects legislation to
an enumerated power, Justice Kennedy expressed concern over
the majority’s application of the terms “rationally related” and
“rational basis” to its analysis under the Necessary and Proper
Clause.235 While the majority opinion did not clarify how “rational” a rational basis must be in order to justify the enactment
of legislation under the Necessary and Proper Clause, Justice
Kennedy asserted that such an analysis should run “parallel”
to the standard applied in Commerce Clause cases—one that
requires a “link in fact” between the legislation enacted and the
purported enumerated power.236
Similarly, Justice Alito concurred in the judgment, but
expressed concern with the majority’s approach. Like Justice
Kennedy, Justice Alito believed that § 4248 was necessary and
proper, “on narrow grounds,” to the execution of Congress’
constitutional powers.237 However, Justice Alito was weary of
the “breadth” of the majority opinion, as well as the ambiguity that its standard created.238 While maintaining that the Necessary and Proper Clause only grants Congress the authority
to enact laws that carry an enumerated power into execution,
Justice Alito believed that § 4248 was necessary and proper
to executing “the enumerated powers that support the federal
criminal statutes under which the affected prisoners were convicted.”239 Justice Alito noted that in order to exercise its exerCriminal Law Brief

cise its authority, it is a necessary and proper power of Congress
to “criminalize certain conduct,” and moreover, that it is necessary and proper to “provide the operation of a federal criminal
justice system and a federal prison system” in order to regulate
such conduct.240 Thus, he approached § 4248 as a law that takes
this system one step further, and posed the question at issue
as whether it was also necessary and proper for Congress to
“protect the public from dangers created by the federal criminal
justice and prison systems” by enacting this civil commitment
provision.241 In his view, it was—and thus, he concurred with
the judgment of the Court.242
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, dissented. While
the majority summarily stated that § 4248 was necessary and
proper to the execution of an enumerated power, the dissent
insisted that the provision “[e]xecutes no enumerated power.”243
Justice Thomas read a two-part test into McCulloch, maintaining that federal legislation is only valid under the Necessary and
Proper clause if: 1) “it is directed toward a ‘legitimate’ end,”
one that is within the scope of powers “expressly delegated”
to Congress by the Constitution, and 2) there is a “fit” between
federal law (what he describes as “the means”) and the enumerated power the law is designed to serve (what he describes as
“the end”).244 Moreover, Justice Thomas insisted that the relationship between these two requirements is a “linear” one: if it
is not directed toward a legitimate end within the scope of Congress’ enumerated powers, whether there is a “fit” between the
means and the end is irrelevant, regardless of how “necessary”
or “proper” the end may be.245
With this framework in mind, Justice Thomas had a number
of criticisms of the standard that the majority created, as well as
the conclusion that it reached. The majority’s greatest misstep,
Justice Thomas believed, was focusing on the amount of deference the Court owed to Congress in selecting the means that
it adopted, rather than focusing on whether the end itself was
legitimate.246 This, he felt, led the Court to overlook carefully
examining whether § 4248 even served to enact an enumerated
power—something he believed the provision did not do.247
The dissent rejected the notion that § 4248 was necessary
and proper to carry an enumerated power into execution for
three reasons. First, the provision’s definition of a “sexually
dangerous person” does not contain an element that links his
purported dangerousness to the crime that he committed and
thus allows a court to civilly commit an individual in federal
custody even if he had never been charged with or committed a
federal crime that related to sexual violence.248 Second, the provision allows for the civil commitment of an individual beyond
the date that his sentence expires, thus extending the government’s authority over the individual to beyond its authority to
prosecute.249 Finally, Justice Thomas criticized § 4248 for failing to require that the individual deemed “sexually dangerous”
was likely to even violate a law that executed an enumerated
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power in the future.250 In other words, while conceding that the
Federal Government does have the authority to enact certain
laws related to sexual violence when such laws are linked directly to an enumerated power, such as the commerce power, §
4248 contained no hook that tied it to such a power or limited
its reach to jurisdictions in which Congress has “plenary authority.”251 In short, while Justice Thomas recognized that the
powers enumerated to Congress might justify an individual’s
arrest, conviction, or imprisonment, he believed they could not
also justify his civil commitment under § 4248.252
Justice Thomas similarly rejected the remaining factors
that the majority considered in reaching its conclusion. He criticized the majority’s adoption of the Restatement’s definition
of a custodian as a basis to justify the enactment of § 4248, sarcastically noting that he
federal government’s power is derived from
the Constitution, rather than from common
law.253 Moreover, he asserted that the majority “overstate[d] the relevant history” of the
federal government’s involvement in civil
commitment, all the while asserting that a
long-time historical practice cannot “serve as
a substitute for its constitutionality.”254 Finally,
Justice Thomas dismissed § 4248’s “accommodation” of state interests through its allowance for states to
“assume responsibility” of a released individual as “mere window dressing,” and a mere “hollow assurance” that the provision would not disrupt the balance struck between federal and
state powers.255
In short, over the objections of Justice Thomas and Justice Scalia, the Court held that Congress had the authority to
enact § 4248, and that the Necessary and Proper Clause granted
them such authority. While two members of the Court expressed
reservations about the breadth of the Court’s opinion, and the
lack of clarity in the standard that it created, a five-member
majority concluded that in light of the breadth of the Necessary
and Proper Clause, the Court’s long history of involvement in
civil commitment, the government’s custodial interest at stake,
the provision accommodation of state interests, and the narrow
scope of § 4248, the Necessary and Proper Clause provided the
federal government with sufficient authority to enact his piece
of legislation.

large from the dangers that sexual predators pose to our society.
Whether or not this policy was in fact the driving motivation
behind the Court’s decision in Comstock, it had no other option
than to create a new standard under the Necessary and Proper
Clause in order to uphold the validity of the provision. The Act
would not have survived a Commerce Clause analysis under
the stringent three-prong test created in United States v. Lopez,
and even in light of Gonzales v. Raich’s arguable expansion of
Congress’ commerce power, the Court would not have been
able to find that the provision “substantially affects” interstate
commerce without further expanding the scope of the Lopez
test. Moreover, none of the established precedent created under
the Necessary and Proper Clause provided the Court with sufficient support, on its own, to justify validating
this legislation. While McCulloch v. Maryland
created a base line standard—that the end must
be “legitimate” and the means must be “appropriate”256—the Court spoke little else beyond
this requirement, leaving clear how closely
linked the legislation must be to an enumerated
power in order for it to be within the scope of
Congress’ powers.
In Comstock, the Court created a new standard under which issues of federalism and Congress’ authority to enact legislation can be analyzed. In doing
so, it developed a set of five considerations that it may take into
account when determining whether the Necessary and Proper
Clause grants Congress the authority to enact legislation: (1) the
breadth of the Necessary and Proper Clause itself; (2) whether
there is a history of federal involvement in the arena being regulated by a legislative act, (3) whether a “sound reason” exists for
the federal government to become involved in light of the federal interests at stake (4) whether the legislation takes into account, and accommodates for, state interests; and (5) the scope
of the legislation at issue. While leaving unclear whether these
factors might always be taken into account in the future, the
Court concluded here that § 4248 fell within Congress authority
in light of these considerations.
This decision may have profound implications on future
litigation in this area. Up until now, it appeared that the Commerce Clause was the only real avenue for the federal government to take in order to justify legislation that might not appear,
at first glance, to be within its enumerated powers.257 While the
Supreme Court spoke very little of the Necessary and Proper
Clause prior to this decision beyond mere iterations of the language in McCulloch,258 the five factor test that it established will
now almost certainly come into play in future cases. For good or
ill, this decision certainly “breathes new life”259 into the Necessary and Proper Clause, and only time will tell what limitations,
if any, the Court will choose to place on this new standard in the
future.
CLB
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V. Conclusion
Regardless of one’s opinion as to the authority that the federal government has to enact legislation under its Article I powers, there is no doubt that § 4248 aims to serve a significant and
noble public policy purpose: to protect the safety of the public at
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of Constitutional Rights, L.A. Law., June 2009, at 32. His remains
were found two weeks later. Id. His father now serves as the host for
“America’s Most Wanted” and is an advocate for missing and exploited
children. Id.
2
H.R. Rep. No. 109-218, pt. 1, 28–29.
3
U.S. Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs, National
Institute of Justice Research Report, Child Sexual Molestation:
Research Issues 9 (1997), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffiles/163390.pdf.
4
U.S. Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs, Bureau
of Justice Statistics, Criminal Offenders Statistics: Recidivism of Sex
Offenders Released from Prison in 1994 1 (2003), available at http://bjs.
ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/rsorp94.pdf.
5
H.R. Rep. No. 109-218, pt. 1, 28 (citing U.S. Department of Justice
Office of Justice Programs, Center for Sex Offender Management,
Recidivism of Sex Offenders (2001), available at http://www.csom.org/
pubs/recidsexof.html).
6
John Matthew Fabian, To Catch a Predator, and then Commit
Him for Life, The Champion, Feb. 2009, at 45, available at http://www.
johnmatthewfabian.com/documents/to-catch-a-predator-and-thencommit-him-for-life-sexual-offender-risk-assessment-part-one.pdf. In
2007, New York became the eighteenth state to enact legislation calling
for the civil commitment—the involuntary, court-ordered commitment
of a person to a psychiatric hospital or other mental health treatment—of
sexual predators. Id. at 47.
7
The Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L.
No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587 (2006). The Adam Walsh Child Protection and
Safety Act’s most significant provision is the Sex Offender Registration
and Notification Act (SORNA). Salemo & Goldstein, supra note 11, at
32.
8
See 152 Cong. Rec. S8013-14, 1, 4, 6 (establishing that the purpose
of the Act was to unite all fifty states “in common purpose and in league
with one another” and that it “fully integrate[] and expand[] the State
systems” so that communities throughout the country will know when
high-risk sex offenders come to their neighborhoods); see also Salerno &
Goldstein, supra note 1, at 32–33 (noting that the act aims to “standardize
the various state sex offender registries” and contains provisions
providing for the civil commitment of sexually dangerous offenders).
9
18 U.S.C. § 4248 (2006). A “sexually dangerous person” is defined
as “a person who has engaged or attempted to engage in sexually violent
conduct or child molestation and who is sexually dangerous to others.”
18 U.S.C. § 4247(a)(5). A person is “sexually dangerous to others” when
“the person suffers from a serious mental illness, abnormality, or disorder
as a result of which he would have serious difficulty in refraining from
sexually violent conduct or child molestation if released.” 18 U.S.C. §
4247(a)(6).
10
See United States v. Volungus, 599 F. Supp. 2d 68, 71 (D. Mass.
2009) (opposing a court ordered civil commitment on the grounds that
Congress exceeded its authority under the United States Constitution
when it enacted 18 U.S.C §§ 4247 and 4248).
11
Compare id. at 77–78 (overturning § 4248), rev’d, 595 F.3d 1 (1st
Cir. 2010) with United States v. Abregana, 574 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1139 (D.
Haw. 2008) (upholding § 4248).
12
See United States v. Volungus, 595 F.3d 1, 10 (1st. Cir. 2010)
(upholding § 4248); United States v. Tom, 565 F.3d 497, 504 (8th Cir.
2009) (upholding § 4248); United States v. Comstock, 551 F.3d 274, 280
(4th Cir. 2009) (overturning § 4248).
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supra note 22, at 330–33 (discussing the relationship between the
Necessary and Proper Clause and the Tenth Amendment).
38
See Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 247
(1960) (noting that the Necessary and Proper Clause is not a grant of
power on its own but a “caveat that Congress possesses all the means
necessary to carry out” its powers specifically enumerated in Article I §
8).
39
Id. at 407–08.
40
See Jeffrey P. Doss, A Structural Criticism of the DNA Analysis
Backlog Elimination Act, 39 Cumb. L. Rev. 511, 530 (1990) (discussing
the limitations on Congress’ authority to enact federal legislation
despite the leeway provided by the Necessary and Proper Clause); see
also Kenton J. Skarin, Not All Violence is Commerce: Noneconomic,
Violent Criminal Activity, RICO, and Limitations on Congress Under
the Post Raich Commerce Clause, 13 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 187, 216
(2009) (asserting that the Necessary and Proper Clause “does not grant
Congress any extra power and should not allow Congress to circumvent
other Constitutional limitations”); Lawson & Granger, supra note 32, at
274–75 (clarifying that the Necessary and Proper Clause is “not a selfcontained grant of power” and that its exercise “must always be tied to the
exercise of some other identifiable constitutional power of the national
government”).
41
“[The Commerce Clause] has been the authority for a broad array
of federal legislation, ranging from criminal statutes to securities
laws to civil rights laws to environmental laws.” Erwin Chemerinsky,
Constitutional Law Principles and Policies 174 (Richard Epstein ed.,
Aspen L&B 1997).
42
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
43
22 U.S. 1 (1821).
44
Id. at 27. In Gibbons, the State of New York had granted a license
to a ferry company, run by Ogden, the exclusive right to navigate certain
waterways between New York and New Jersey. Id. at 8–9. However,
Gibbons, the owner of another ferry company, navigated his boats on this
same water pursuant to a federal statute that allowed for the deployment
of ships in the “coasting trade” in these waters. Id. at 9–11. The Court
invalidated the New York monopoly, as it was in “collision” with a valid
exercise of the federal government’s constitutional authority. Id. at 87–88.
45
The New Deal refers to United States economic reforms during the
1930’s. See Barry Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court, 80 Va. L.
Rev. 201, 201–202 (1994).
46
156 U.S. 1 (1895).
47
Id. at 7.
48
Id. at 12. In doing so, the Court argued that the power to regulate
commerce is independent of the “power to suppress monopoly” because
the regulation of a monopoly “does not control” commerce. Id.
49
Houston E. & W. Tex. Ry. Co. v. United States (The Shreveport Rate
Case), 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
50
Id. at 351. In this case, the Court upheld a railroad carrier’s policy of
setting lower rates for intrastate travel than it did for railway travel across
state lines. Id. at 346.
51
196 U.S. 375 (1905).
52
Id. at 398–99. In Swift, the target of Congress’ regulation was each
state’s livestock market. Id. at 394. The Court upheld a law that made it
illegal for meat dealers to monopolize and prevent competition. Id. at
394–95.
53
See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 304 (1936)
(overturning act aiming to regulate hours and wages on the grounds
that the effect of the provision “primarily [fell] upon production and not
commerce”); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495,
546 (1935) (overturning wage, hours, and trade practice provisions of
legislation because such legislation targeted manufacturing rather than
commerce).
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301 U.S. 1 (1937).
Id. at 37. The NLRA created the National Labor Relations Board,
which allowed for labor organization and collective bargaining practiced.
Id. at 24.
56
312 U.S. 100 (1941).
57
Id. at 121. The Court upheld the Fair Labor Standards Act, which
prevented the interstate shipment of products and commodities produced
under unfair working conditions. See id. at 125.
58
317 U.S. 111 (1942).
59
Id. at 129 (upholding the Agricultural Adjustment Act, which
set quotas for farmers’ wheat production in an attempt to regulate the
market supply and demand of the product). The Court held that even
the appellee’s personal consumption of wheat could be regulated, as
the aggregate effect of many farmers growing wheat for personal
consumption would lead to changes in supply and demand of the product
as a whole. Id. at 129–30.
60
See A. Christopher Bryant, The Third Death of Federalism, 17
Cornell J.L. Pub. Pol’y 101, 138 (2007) (noting that “the [Supreme]
Court upheld every federal statute that regulated private conduct” that
was challenged under Congress’ commerce power); Brandon J. Stoker,
Comment, Was Gonzales v. Raich the Death Knell of Federalism?
Assessing Meaningful Limits on Federal Intrastate Regulation in Light
of U.S. v. Nascimento, 23 BYU J. Pub. L. 317, 325 (2009) (identifying
the time between the New Deal and the Rehnquist federalism revival as a
“half-century of nearly unquestioned judicial acquiescence”).
61
514 U.S. 549 (1995).
62
Id. at 551.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 558.
65
Examples of “channels” of interstate commerce include roads,
rivers, railroad tracks, or any other medium through which goods
might travel. See, e.g., The Shreveport Rate Case, 234 U.S. 342, 351
(1914) (recognizing the railroad system as a means of “commercial
intercourse”); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 22 (asserting that Congress
has power over regulation of “the waters,” including lakes, rivers, and the
“high seas”).
66
Examples of “instrumentalities” of interstate commerce include
anything that may transport or ship goods, including trucks, ships, trains,
etc. See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971) (citing
aircrafts as an example of an instrumentality of interstate commerce);
The Shreveport Rate Case, 234 U.S. at 351 (recognizing that trains are
instruments of interstate commerce); Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 94 (referring to
ships and vessels as “instruments” of commerce”).
67
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557.
68
See id. at 559 (observing that the law did not regulate the channels
of interstate commerce, nor could it “be justified as a regulation by which
Congress has sought to protect an instrumentality of interstate commerce
or a thing in interstate commerce”).
69
Id. at 561.
70
Id. at 561. However, scholars have criticized this decision for not
adequately detailing guidelines as to what constitutes “substantial” or
how to calculate this effect. See, e.g., Robert J. Pushaw, The Medical
Marijuana Case: A Commerce Clause Counter-Revolution?, 9 Lewis &
Clark L. Rev. 879, 895 (2005) (asserting that the majority simply stated
that the possession of guns in school zones did not substantially affect
interstate commerce, while the dissent insisted that it did).
71
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561–62. In doing so, the Court rejected the
government’s assertion that the possession of a firearm in a school zone
has a substantial impact on interstate commerce because (1) “the costs of
violent crime are substantial and . . . spread throughout the population,”
(2) violent crimes discourage interstate travel, and (3) that the presence
of guns “threaten[s] the learning environment” and, consequently, “would
55
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have an adverse effect on the Nation’s economic well-being.” Id. at
563–64 (citations omitted). The Court expressed concern that adopting
these arguments would give Congress the authority to regulate “not
only violent crime, but all activities that might lead to violent crime,”
regardless of how attenuated the link to commerce may be. Id. at 564.
72
Id. 567–68.
73
529 U.S. 598 (2000).
74
Id. at 605.
75
Id. at 610, 612.
76
Compare id. at 599 (“§ 13981 . . . is supported by numerous findings
regarding the serious impact that gender-motivated violence on victims
and their families . . . .”) (emphasis in original) with Lopez, 514 U.S. at
562 (pointing out that neither the act at issue, nor is legislative history,
purported any finding as to the effect possession of a gun in a school zone
had on interstate commerce). Specifically, the findings purported that
gender-motivated violence affected interstate commerce “by deterring
potential victims from traveling interstate, from engaging in employment
in interstate business . . . by diminishing national productivity, increasing
medical and other costs, and decreasing the supply of and the demand for
interstate products.” Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615 (citations omitted).
77
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614–15. The “method of reasoning” the Court
was referring to here was Congress’ argument that gender-motivated
violence had the effect of ”deterring potential victims from traveling
interstate, from engaging in employment in interstate business, and from
transacting with business, and in places involved in interstate commerce
. . . .” Id. at 615. This argument was similar to the “costs of crime”
argument that the government put forth in Lopez, asserting that “violent
crime reduces the willingness of individuals to travel to areas within the
country that are perceived to be unsafe.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564. The
Court rejected this argument in Lopez. Id.
78
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615.
79
Id. at 618.
80
Id. at 618; see David M. Cromwell, Note, Gonzales v. Raich and
the Development of Commerce Clause Jurisprudence: Is the Necessary
and Proper Clause the Perfect Drug? 38 Rutgers L.J. 251, 282 (2008)
(suggesting that Morrison “solidified” the principles established in Lopez
regarding the importance of an activity regulated by Congress being
economic in nature).
81
See Pushaw, supra note 69, at 894 (stating that the decisions in Lopez
and Morrison “built upon the logically assailable premise that . . . the
Commerce Clause cannot be interpreted in a way that effectively leaves
Congress with absolute discretion”).
82
545 U.S. 1 (2005).
83
Id. at 22.
84
Id. at 13.
85
Id. at 15.
86
Id. at 18–19.
87
Id. at 25–26. The Court asserted that all it had to determine was
whether it had a “rational basis” for concluding that the respondent’s
activities had a substantial effect on interstate commerce, which it found
here. Id. at 22.
88
Id. at 33 (Scalia, J., concurring).
89
Id. at 39.
90
Id. at 39–40.
91
Id. at 40. Justice Scalia reasoned that the CSA was an appropriate
means to curb the existence of marijuana in interstate commerce because
“marijuana that is grown at home and possessed for personal use is never
more than in instant from the interstate market,” regardless of whether
this home consumption was for medicinal or any other lawful use. Id.
Moreover, he rejected the idea that state law would be “effective” in
maintaining a divide between a “lawful” marijuana market for medicinal
purposes and “the more general marijuana market.” Id. at 40–41.
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92
See Maxwell L. Stearns, The New Commerce Clause Doctrine in
Game Theoretical Perspective, 60 Vand. L. Rev. 1, 3 (2007) (noting that
while the Rehnquist Court was successful in implementing “substantive
limits” on the scope of Congress’ commerce authority, it was not as
successful in “developing a coherent normative theory that reconciled its
new doctrinal limitations with the traditional broad scope of the post-New
Deal Commerce Clause cases”).
93
See Bryant, supra note 59, at 154–55 (observing that a dispute now
exists among scholars as to whether Raich “marks the end of the Lopez
Revolution” or instead is “merely a minor diversion from the course
Lopez had launched”); see also Stearns, supra note 91, at 26 (noting
that none of the Justice’s opinions in Raich puts forth a framework
that reconcile the limitations imposed by the Supreme Court’s recent
Commerce Clause decisions with the post-New Deal expansion of
that power). See infra. Part III.b.ii for an argument that Raich will not
necessarily be controlling in future Commerce Clause cases.
94
U.S. Const. amend. X.
95
See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819)
(asserting that the principle that the federal government can only exercise
its enumerated powers is “universally admitted”).
96
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 78–80 (1824).
97
See Santiago Legarre, The Historical Background of the Police
Power, 9 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 745, 778 (2007) (asserting that the Tenth
Amendment “functions as a principal constitutional basis of state police
power”).
98
United States v. Lopez, 519 U.S. 549, 566 (1995).
99
Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587 (2006).
100
Id.
101
See 152 Cong. Rec. S8013 (2006) (stating that the purpose of the bill
was to prevent “lowlife[]” sex offenders from finding loopholes and “slipping through the cracks” by creating unity among the fifty states); H.R.
Rep. No. 109-218, pt. 1, at 27 (describing the bill as one meant “to address loopholes and deficiencies in existing laws”). See generally Salerno
& Goldstein, supra note 1, at 32–33 (laying out the key provisions of the
Adam Walsh Act).
102
See 18 U.S.C. § 4248(a) (2006). Legislative history suggests that
Congress enacted this provision in order to assure that “offenders with
mental disorders who are clearly dangerous,” may be civilly committed,
even if their disorder “do[es] not fall within the narrowly applied
definition of mental illness.” H.R. Rep. No. 109-218, pt. 1, at 35 (2005). It
applies to federal sex offenders with “serious mental illness, abnormality,
or disorder.” Id. Prior to the enactment of § 4248, civil commitment
provisions required an offender to be hospitalized while incarcerated, and
be suffering from a “mental disease or defect.” Id. The apparent purpose,
then, of § 4248 was to broaden the scope of those sex offenders who
could be civilly committed. See id. (criticizing the then existing law for
excluding offenders who were “clearly dangerous but . . . [did] not fall
within the narrowly applied definition of mental illness”).
103
18 U.S.C. § 4247(a)(5)–(6) (2006). Although § 4247 does not define
“sexually violent conduct” or “child molestation,” the Bureau of Prisons
proposed regulations to provide for these definitions and to clarify the
process that it will use to determine whether an individual in custody
meets these definitions. Civil Commitment of a Sexually Dangerous
Person, 72 Fed. Reg. 43205-06 (proposed Aug. 3, 2007) (to be codified
at 28 C.F.R. pt. 549). The Bureau purported to define “sexually violent
conduct” as “any unlawful conduct of a sexual nature with another
person” that involved one of a number of enumerated violent actions.
Id. at 43,207–08. It further purported to define “child molestation” as
“any unlawful conduct of a sexual nature with, or sexual exploitation of,
a person under the age of 18 years.” Id. at 43,207. See generally Fabian,
supra note 6, at 45–46 for a further discussion of “unresolved” issues
surrounding § 4248.
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18 U.S.C. § 4248(a).
18 U.S.C. § 4248(d). At the hearing, the person whose mental
condition is being evaluated is represented by counsel, and has the
opportunity to testify, present evidence, and to subpoena, confront, and
cross-examine witnesses. 18 U.S.C. § 4247(d).
106
18 U.S.C. § 4248(d).
107
18 U.S.C. § 4248(e).
108
See Fabian, supra note 6, 47–48 (pointing out that New York is
now the eighteenth state to implement legislation providing for the civil
commitment of sex offenders).
109
Salerno & Goldstein, supra note 1, at 35.
110
Id.; see also Fabian, supra note 6, at 44 (expressing concern that
because § 4248 lacks a “likely to reoffend” requirement, “low-risk” and
“non-contact” offenders may end up civilly committed indefinitely).
111
See Salerno & Goldstein, supra note 1, at 35 (indicating that an
offender can remain in custody beyond the expiration of his or her
sentence while awaiting the government’s determination as to the danger
he or she poses).
112
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 4241 (2006) (allowing the Government to
civilly commit a defendant “at any time after the commencement of
a prosecution . . . and prior to the sentencing” if determined that the
defendant is mentally incompetent to go through with the prosecution
proceedings); see also Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366, 373
(1956) (upholding a statute that called for the civil commitment of those
charged with federal crimes but incapable to stand trial due to mental
incompetence).
113
551 F.3d 274 (4th Cir. 2009).
114
Id. at 284.
115
Id. at 280.
116
Id. The Court maintained that § 4248 bears “striking resemblance” to
the statute at issue in Morrison in that it “provides a civil remedy aimed
at the prevention of noneconomic sexual violence.” Id. at 279. In so finding, the Court’s rationale in Morrison that the “regulation and punishment
of intrastate violence . . . has always been the province of the States”
applied here with “equal force.” Id. at 279–80 (quoting United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618–19 (2000)).
117
Id. at 281–84.
118
Id. at 279 (emphasis in original).
119
Id. at 278 (citing United States v. Sahhar, 56 F.3d 1026 (9th Cir.1995)
(noting that in the exercise of their general police and parens patriae
powers, the states have long controlled the civil commitment of the
mentally ill).
120
565 F.3d 497 (8th Cir. 2009) [hereinafter Tom II].
121
Id. at 501.
122
Id. at 505. The court maintained that prior commitment of a sexually
violent crime was indicative of one’s “propensity” to engage in other
federally prohibited sexual conduct in the future, and that the civil
commitment provision was aimed at preventing further commitment of
sexually violent crimes. Id. at 506. It thus viewed this potential prevention
of future crime commitment as the necessary nexus between § 4248 and
interstate commerce. Id. at 505–06.
123
Id. at 503. The respondent in Tom was convicted of violating 18
U.S.C. § 2241(c), which made it a crime to cross state lines with the
intent to engage in a sexual act with a minor. Id. at 504.
124
Tom II, 565 F.3d at 504. In his concurring opinion in Raich, Justice
Scalia maintained that Congress’ authority to regulate intrastate activities
that are not a part of interstate commerce stems from the Necessary and
Proper Clause, and that the authority to enact laws that are necessary and
proper to Congress’ regulation of interstate commerce “is not limited
to laws governing intrastate activities that substantially affect interstate
commerce.” Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 34–35 (2005) (Scalia, J.,
concurring). He insisted that Congress has the authority to “regulate even
105

38

noneconomic local activity if that regulation is a necessary part of a more
general regulation of interstate commerce” so long as the “means chosen
are ‘reasonably adapted’ to the attainment of a legitimate end under the
commerce power.” Id. at 37.
125
Tom II, 565 F.3d at 504–05 (citing Raich, 545 U.S. at 35).
126
Id. at 506.
127
Id. at 505–06.
128
United States v. Volungus, 595 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2010).
129
350 U.S. 366 (1956).
130
Volungus, 595 F.3d at 6.
131
Greenwood, 350 U.S. at 367-68.
132
Volungus, 595 F.3d at 7. But see infra notes 232–244 (distinguishing
the law at issue in Comstock from the law at issue in Greenwood).
133
Compare United States v. Abregana, 574 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1133–34
(D. Haw. 2008) (upholding § 4248); United States v. Dowell, No. CIV-061216-D, 2007 WL 5361304, at *7 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 5, 2007) (upholding §
4248); United States v. Shields, 522 F. Supp. 2d 317, 328 (D. Mass. 2007)
(upholding § 4248); United States v. Carta, 503 F. Supp. 2d 405, 409, 410
(D. Mass. 2007) (upholding § 4248) with United States v. Wilkinson, 626
F. Supp. 2d 184 (D. Mass. 2009) (overturning § 4248); United States v.
Volungus, 599 F. Supp. 2d 68, 80 (D. Mass. 2009) (overturning § 4248);
United States v. Tom, 558 F. Supp. 2d 931, 941 (D. Minn. 2008) [hereinafter Tom I] (overturning § 4248), rev’d, 565 F.3d 497 (8th Cir. 2009);
United States v. Comstock, 507 F. Supp. 2d 522, 559 (E.D.N.C. 2007)
(overturning § 4248), aff’d, 551 F.3d 374 (4th Cir. 2009).
134
See, e.g., Abregana, 574 F. Supp. 2d at 1129–30 (holding that Congress had the authority to enact § 4248 because “it has the power to criminalize certain conduct and to ‘make all laws which shall be necessary and
proper’ to execute its enumerated power”); Dowell, 2007 WL 5361304,
at *7 (concluding that Congress was authorized to enact § 4248, as it “is
a necessary and proper exercise of the federal government’s power under
the Commerce Clause to prevent the commission of federal sex crimes);
Shields, 522 F. Supp. 2d at 326 (“Section 4248 is a necessary and proper
exercise of the federal government’s power under the Commerce Clause
to prevent the commission of federal sex crimes.”); Carta, 503 F. Supp.
2d at 408 (determining that the scope of Congress’ “auxiliary power . . .
extends so far as to allow Congress to prevent the release of those lawfully in custody”).
135
See, e.g., Wilkinson, 626 F. Supp. 2d at 194 (holding the government
reliance on the Necessary and Proper Clause “undermine[d] the historic
distinction between state and federal authority” and that the enactment
of § 4248 “exceeded Congress’s powers under the Commerce Clause
and Necessary and Proper Clause”); Volungus, 599 F. Supp. 2d at 77–78
(concluding that because § 4248 “offers only remote and contingent
support for the regulation of interstate commerce” and “encroaches on an
area of law-making that has historically been . . . a matter of the exercise
by the States,” it does not fall within the scope of congressional authority
to enact legislation); Tom I, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 941 (ruling that because
Congress had exceeded its authority in enacting § 4248, the court was
“required to take the uncommon but necessary step of finding that the
statute [was] unconstitutional); Comstock, 507 F. Supp. 2d at 559 (finding
that § 4248 is unconstitutional because § 4248 “is not sufficiently tied to
the exercise of any enumerated or otherwise identifiable constitutional
power of Congress”).
136
United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. ___,No. 08-1224, 2010 WL
1946729 at *15 (May 17, 2010).
137
See, e.g., United States v. Abregana, 574 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1131-32
(D. Haw. 2008) (arguing that Congress had the authority to enact § 4248,
since it has the authority under the Commerce Clause “to criminalize
and punish” the type of conduct that offenders to whom § 4248 applies
to have committed); see also United States v. Tom, 565 F.3d 497, 595
(8th Cir. 2009) (holding that “Congress, having been empowered by the
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Commerce Clause to criminalize and punish the conduct of which [the
respondent] is guilty, has the ancillary authority under the Necessary and
Proper Clause to provide for his civil commitment”); United States v.
Shields, 522 F. Supp. 2d 317, 325-326 (D. Mass. 2007) (stating that “it is
difficult to accept the proposition” that the government cannot prevent the
release of an individual who has committed a crime for which the federal
government has the power to enact under the Commerce Clause); United
States v. Dowell, No. CIV-06-1216-D, 2007 WL 5361304, at *5 (W.D.
Okla. Dec. 5 2007) (noting that the government contended that “§ 4248 is
a rational means of safeguarding Congress’s ability to prevent the future
commissions of the acts which it is authorized to prohibit”).
138
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 22, United States v. Comstock,
560 U.S. __ (2010) (No. 08-1224) (Solicitor General Elena Kagan stating
that the government was not arguing the Commerce Clause “because of . .
. the Morrison precedent”).
139
Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 26 (2005).
140
See supra Part I.b for an in-depth discussion of how Congress’
Commerce Power expanded during most of the Twentieth Century. The
Rehnquist Court overturned legislation on Commerce Power grounds for
the first time in five decades in United States v. Lopez, limiting Congress’
ability to enact legislation that sought to protect the safety and wellbeing of our nation. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). The Court again overturned
legislation on commerce power grounds five years later in United States
v. Morrison. U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
141
See Bryant, supra note 47, at 154-55 (observing that a debate
among scholars has arisen as to whether Raich “mark[ed] the end of the
Lopez revolution or merely a minor diversion from the course Lopez had
launched”);”) Corey Rayburn Young, One of these Laws is Not Like the
Others: Why the Federal Sex Offender Registration And Notification Act
Raises New Constitutional Questions, 46 Harv. J. on Legis. 369, 409
(2009) (explaining that, because the Supreme Court has not reviewed
any legislation under commerce clause jurisprudence since Raich, there
remains “substantial uncertainty as to the precise meaning of Raich in
relation to the prior decisions in Lopez and Morrison”); Skarin, supra
note 29, at 206 (accusing the Court’s Raich decision of “muddying . . .
commerce clause jurisprudence”).
142
See Bryant, supra note 47, at 155 (asserting that “history strongly
suggests” that Raich will “prove fatal to [the] hope]” that Lopez and
Morrison “held promise of a meaningful judicial enforcement of the
enumerated powers scheme,” as Raich demonstrates that the Court cannot
“stretch congressional powers to encompass plenary authority” over
portions of a targeted regulation “while simultaneously preserving robust
judicial enforcement of the enumerated powers scheme”);
143
See Pushaw, supra note 58, at 908 (asserting that it would be
“premature to pronounce Raich the death knell of the Rehnquist Court’s
Commerce Clause revolution,” as the Court’s majority and concurring
opinions reaffirmed Morrison and Lopez by applying those cases’
“imprecise standards on a case by case basis”); Skarin, supra note 29,
at 212 (arguing that the “economic/noneconomic” distinction applied in
Raich was proper because it was “at least plausible” that Congress had the
authority to regulate the respondents’ activities because they “involve[d]
the economics of agricultural commodities”).
144
See Raich, 545 U.S. at 23 (distinguishing itself by noting that the
respondents were asking the Court to “excise individual applications of a
concededly valid statutory schemes,” whereas Lopez and Morrison “fell
outside Congress’ commerce power in its entirety”) (emphasis added).
In fact, even the respondents in Raich conceded that the passage of the
CSA was “well within Congress’ power,” and, consequently, challenged
the law’s regulation of the manufacture and possession of marijuana as
applied to their use of it for medical purposes. Id. at 15.
145
See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 604 (2000) (stating that
the petitioners moved to dismiss their case on grounds that the Act’s civil
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remedy provision was unconstitutional); United State v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549, 552 (1995) (noting that the respondent was challenging the GFSZA
on grounds that it exceeded Congress’ authority to enact legislation under
the commerce clause).
146
Raich, 545 U.S. at 15.
147
Raich, 545 U.S. at 23. (citations and internal quotations omitted).
148
The respondents in Raich even conceded that the Controlled
Substances Act was valid on its face. Raich, 545 U.S. at 15. They did
not seek to invalidate the statute completely; they merely wanted it
invalidated as applied to their particular use of marijuana for medicinal
purposes. Id.
149
See Doss, supra note 29, at 528 (suggesting that facial challenges to
federal legislation “trigger[] application of the framework established in
Lopez and refined in Morrison” while as-applied challenges “operate[]
the more deferential and expansive Raich standards”).
150
Lopez challenged the constitutionality of the Gun-Free School
Zones Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1988 ed., Supp. V). United States
v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995). This Act made it unlawful “for any
individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual
knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone.” Id. at 551.
151
Morrison challenged the constitutionality of a provision 18 U.S.C.
§ 13981. U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 601 (2000). This provision
declared that “A person . . . who commits a crime of violence motivated
by gender . . . shall be liable to the party injured, in an action for
the recovery of compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive and
declaratory relief, and such other relief as a court may deem appropriate.”
Id. at 605 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 13981(c)).
152
See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617-18 (recognizing that the “regulation
and punishment of intrastate violence” is the a clear example of the type
of police power that “the Founders denied the National Government and
reposed in the States); United State v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995)
(insisting that the federal government does not have a “general police
power of the sort retained to the states).
153
The Gun-Free School Zones Act at issue in Lopez sought to
regulate an individual’s possession of a firearm while in a school zone
by criminalizing such conduct. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551. The provision of
the Violence Against Women Act at issue in Morrison sought to regulate
“violence motivated by gender” by making those who committed such
violence liable for compensatory and punitive damages, as well as
injunctive and declaratory relief, to the party that they injured. Morrison,
529 U.S. at 605.
154
As discussed above, the Supreme Court cited this shortcoming as
among the reasons for overturning each of these acts. See supra Part
I.b for a more comprehensive discussion of the Court’s decision in each
respective case.
155
See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609 (maintaining that the “regulation
and punishment of intrastate violence” has generally always been in the
realm of state authority); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566 (1995) (insisting, in
overturning the GFSZA, that the federal government does not have a
general police power). See supra Part I.c for a general discussion of the
powers that the Tenth Amendment reserves to the states and the types of
police power legislation the federal government does have the authority to
enact.
156
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 24-25 (2005).
157
Id. at 25-26. They recognized the activities as economic because they
affected the “production, distribution, and consumption of commodities.”
Id. at 25.
158
Id. at 22. In particular, the Court reasoned that Congress had a
rational basis for believing that the respondents’ home consumption
of marijuana could influence the “supply and demand of controlled
substances in both lawful and unlawful drug markets,” just as the farmer
in Wickard’s home consumption of wheat could have “a substantial
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influence on price and market conditions.” Id. at 18-19 (citing Wickard v.
Filburn, 317 U.S. 311, 115 (1942)).
159
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610.
160
Id. at 605.
161
United State v. Lopez 514 U.S. at 551.
162
See 18 U.S.C. 4248(e) (permitting the release of an offender under
the civil commitment program when the director of the facility in which
he is placed determines that he is “no longer sexually dangerous to
others”).
163
Raich, 545 U.S. at 25, 27.
164
Id. at 26-27.
165
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558.
166
The Court quickly dismissed the GFSZA under this first prong.
See id. at 559 (observing that the first prong could be “quickly disposed
of,” as the GFSZA was did not regulate the use of channels of interstate
commerce).
167
See supra note 54 for a discussion of what constitutes “channels” of
interstate commerce.
168
18 U.S.C. § 4248.
169
In Lopez, the Court dismissed the GFSZA under this second prong
just as quickly as it dismissed the act under the first prong, merely
asserting that it was not a regulation “by which Congress has sought to
protect an instrumentality of interstate commerce. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559.
Similarly, the Court recognized in Morrison that Congress did not purport
that the challenged VAWA provision fell under this category. Morrison,
529 U.S. at 609.
170
See supra note 55 for examples of “instrumentalities” of interstate
commerce.
171
One indication of whether an act of legislation regulates
“instrumentalities” or persons or things within interstate commerce
whether the statute invokes a requirement that the act or person sought to
be regulated is either tied to interstate commerce of federal jurisdiction
(jurisdictional element). See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 588, 561 (noting that if
the act included a jurisdictional element, the second prong of the test
might have been satisfied). Compare 18 U.S.C. § 4248 (lacking any
jurisdictional requirements) with 18 U.S.C. § 1591 (conditioning the act
upon the violator being “in or affecting interstate commerce or foreign
commerce, or within the special maritime and territory”); 18 U.S.C.
§ 2242 (2007) (limiting the reach of the law to those “in the special
maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or in any Federal
prison”; 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (2008) (outlawing persons from transporting or
shipping visual depictions of minors “in interstate or foreign commerce”).
See infra Part V for a more thorough discussion as to the impact that
including a jurisdictional element may have on the constitutionality of §
4248.
172
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557.
173
See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612.
174
Id. at 611.
175
See Id. at 610 (noting that a “fair reading of Lopez shows that the
non-economic, criminal nature of the conduct at issue was central” to its
decision in that case that the GFSZA was unconstitutional).
176
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562-63. It also rejected the government’s
argument that violent crime in school zones can have an effect on the
national economy as a demonstration that the provision had a substantial
effect on interstate commerce. Id. at 563-64.
177
See Comstock, 551 F.3d at 280 (noting that the record in this case
contained no legislative findings indicating that sexual dangerousness
would have a substantial effect on interstate commerce); see also
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562-63 (proposing that legislative findings regarding
a statute’s effect on interstate commerce might enable the Court to
“evaluate the legislative judgment” that the activity being regulated
affects interstate commerce). Though the Court conceded that such
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findings are not normally required, it purported that such findings could
be useful when “no such substantial effect [is] visible to the naked eye.”
Id. at 562-63.
178
See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614, (asserting that “simply because
Congress may conclude that a particular activity substantially affects
interstate commerce does not necessarily make it so)” (quoting Lopez,
514 U.S. at 557). In Morrison, the government did put forth findings
concerning the “serious impact that gender-motivated violence has on
victims and their families.” Id at 599..
179
See id. at 615 (“If accepted, petitioners’ reasoning would allow
Congress to regulate any crime as long as the nationwide, aggregated
impact of that crime has substantial effects on employment, production,
transit, or consumption.”).
180
In both cases, the Court emphasized that Congress’ authority under
the Commerce Clause is not without limit. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607;
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567. In Morrison, the Court emphasized Chief Justice
Marshall’s contention in Marbury v. Madison that “The powers of the
legislature are defined and limited; and that those limits may not be
mistake or forgotten, the constitution is written.” Morrison, 529 U.S. at
607 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803)).
In Lopez, the Court noted that even modern Commerce Clause precedent
that had expanded Congress’ commerce power “confirm[ed]]. . .] that the
scope of the interstate commerce power . . . may not be extended so as to
embrace effects upon interstate commerce so indirect and remote” that
adopting them would “obliterate the distinction between what is national
and what is local.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556-57 (citations and internal
quotations omitted).
181
See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615 (asserting that if the Court upheld
the VAWA, it would allow Congress “to regulate any crime as long as the
nationwide, aggregated impact of that crime has substantial effects on
employment, production, transit, or consumption”).
182
See The Mighty Sweeping Clause and Expansive Federal Power,
Constitutional Law Prof Blog, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/conlaw
(May 18, 2010).
183
Raich, 545 U.S. at 25-26.
184
As noted above, the Court in Raich maintained that “’ [e]conomics’
refers to the ‘production, distribution, and consumption of commodities.”
Id. at 26 (citation omitted).
185
Comstock, 551 F.3d at 279.
186
See Raich, 545 U.S. at 30 (finding that the personal consumption of
marijuana, taken in aggregation, could “have a significant impact on both
the supply and demand sides of the market for marijuana”).
187
Id. at 34 (Scalia, J., concurring).
188
Id.
189
Id. at 35-37 (Scalia, J., concurring).
190
Id. at 41-42.
191
The Eighth Circuit adopted Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion
in United States v. Tom, in upholding § 4248. 565 F.3d 497, 502 (8th
Cir. 2009). However, in the only other lower court opinion to address
Justice Scalia’s concurrence, United States v. Wilkinson, the District of
Massachusetts recognized that Raich did not apply because “there was no
comprehensive scheme of regulation of interstate commerce threatened”
by § 4248. 626 F. Supp. 2d 184, 191-92 (D. Mass. 2009).
192
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; see also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 356 (1819) (“To make a law constitutional, nothing
more is necessary than that it should be fairly adapted to carry into effect
some specific power given to congress.”); Lawson & Granger, supra note
22, at 331 (observing that congressional laws “must respect the system of
enumerated federal powers” and may not regulate activities that fall outside the scope of powers enumerated in the Constitution).
193
United States v. Comstock, 551 F.3d 274, 281 (2009).
194
For example, in United States v. Dowell, 2007 WL 5361304 at *5,
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the Western District of Oklahoma based its decision to uphold § 4248 in
large part on the Third Circuit’s decision in United States v. Perry, 788
F.2d 100 (3d. Cir. 1986). In Perry, the Third Circuit upheld 18 U.S.C. §
3142(e), which authorizes the pre-trial detention of an accused person
when nothing could reasonably assure that this person would appear
for trial or that the community would be unsafe if such a person were
released. Id. at 111, 103. The Third Circuit concluded that because Congress had the authority to enact the federal laws for which the defendant
was accused of committing, it had “the auxiliary authority” through the
Necessary and Proper Clause to civilly commit these persons to prevent
the recurrence of crime. Id.
The district court in Dowell also based its argument on a Tenth
Circuit case, United States v. Plotts, 347 F.3d 873 (10th Cir. 2003), which
held that the Necessary and Proper Clause gives congress the power
to enact laws “that bear a rational connection to any of its enumerated
powers United States v. Plotts, 347 F.3d 873,878 (10th Cir. 2003)
(quoting United States v. Edgar, 304 F.3d 1320, 1326 (11th Cir. 2002)).
The Tenth Circuit relied on the fact that the respondent had committed
a crime that Congress had the authority to enact through its commerce
power, and concluded that the DNA Act, which was at issue in Plotts,
was a “necessary and proper sanction” to this “valid criminal law.” Id.
at 878-79. The Court also maintained that even if the DNA Act was
viewed as a “law enforcement tool,” rather than a “sanction,” the law
would then have been a necessary and proper exercise of the Executive
branch’s law enforcement powers. Id. The Court essentially applied the
framework under this scenario as it did in construing the DNA Act as
a sanction—that the law the respondent had violated was valid under
Congress’ commerce power, and that the Necessary and Proper Clause
gives Congress the authority to enact laws that aid the executive branch
in its “duty to take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” Id. at 779
(citations omitted)
Such heavy reliance on Courts of Appeals cases are indicative of
the fact that the Courts who have upheld § 4248 under the Necessary
and Proper Clause had no Supreme Court precedent to support their
argument. That the Third and Tenth Circuits came to these conclusions
on the application of the Necessary and Proper Clause did not indicate
that the Supreme Court will adopt their arguments, as Appellate Court
decisions have no binding authority over the Supreme Court. See U.S.
Const. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be
vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress
may from time to time ordain and establish.”) (emphasis added). See
generally United States v. Abregana, 574 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1131 (D. Haw.
2008) (relying on decisions in 9th and 10th Circuit in implementing its §
4248 rationale); United States v. Dowell, No. CIV-06-1216-D, 2007 WL
5361304, at *5 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 5 2007) (citing 10th and 11th Circuit
cases as its basis for its necessary and proper rationale).
195
At oral arguments, Solicitor General Kagan summarily referred
to Congress’ “power to run a criminal justice system that does not
itself endanger the public” as the power “conferred upon the Federal
Government by the Constitution” to enact § 4248. Transcript of Oral
Argument at 7, United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. __ (2010) (No.
08-1224). Even in the Comstock majority opinion itself, Justice Breyer
merely alluded to a number of powers the Constitution grants Congress,
including the power to regulate interstate commerce, to enforce civil
rights, and to expend funds for the welfare of the public, without pointing
to precisely which power granted Congress the authority to enact § 4248.
United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. ___,No. 08-1224, 2010 WL 1946729
at *7 (May 17, 2010).
196
350 U.S. 366 (1956); see, e.g., United States v. Tom, 565 F.3d 397,
504 (8th Cir. 2009) (maintaining that Greenwood was “dispositive” of the
issue § 4248 presented); United States v. Abregana, 574 F. Supp. 2d 1123,
1130 (D. Haw. 2008) (recognizing that, while the decision in Greenwood
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was limited to the facts of that case, “the basis of the decision [was]
instructive”); United States v. Shields, 522 F. Supp. 2d 317, 325 (D. Mass.
2007) (observing that Greenwood reasoning at least applies to those who
are in custody of the Attorney General based on their incompetency to
stand trial under § 4248).
197
Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366, 368 (1956).
198
Id. at 375
199
See id. (“We reach then the narrow constitutional issue raised by
the order of commitment in the circumstances of this case.”) (emphasis
added).
200
Id.
201
18 U.S.C. § 4248(a).
202
Id.
203
See Salerno & Goldstein, supra note 1, at 32-33 (discussing the
depth and breadth of the Act’s reach); Fabian, supra note 66, at 44,
50 (expressing concerns that the act will result in the indefinite civil
commitment of “low-risk” and “non-contact” sex offenders, as “sex
offenders who suffer from any type of mental illness, disorder, or
abnormality may be committed under the AWA”); Amy Baron-Evans and
Sara Noonan, Grid & Bear It, Champion, July 2008 at 58, 58 (calling to
attention that the statute “does not require a current or prior sex-related
conviction or even a sex-related charge,” but rather that anyone in the
custody of the Bureau of Prisons may be civilly committed under this
program).
204
Greenwood, 350 U.S. at 375; see also Salerno & Goldstein, supra
note 1, at 32, 35 (noting that under the Act, the government can wait to
determine the danger an offender poses until after his sentence has been
completed).
205
See Comstock, 551 F.3d at 282 (noting that most violent sex offenses
are state, rather than federal, offenses).
206
See Cong. Rec. S8017, 2006 WL 2034117 (noting that before the
enactment of the Adam Walsh Act, three-quarters of all violent sex
offenders re-committed their original crime).
207
See id. (holding that because most sexually violent crimes are
prohibited under state law, § 4248 “sweeps far too broadly,” as many of
the civil commitments imposed under § 4248 would prevent the future
commission of state law).
208
See United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. ___,No. 08-1224, 2010
WL 1946729 at *13 (May 17, 2010) (citing Greenwood as an example
of precedent that infers the power of the federal government to civilly
commit prisioners).
209
Comstock at *3 (internal quotations omitted).
210
Id. at *15.
211
Id. at *5.
212
Id.
213
Id. at *6 (emphasis added) (quoting Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S.
600, 605 (2004).
214
Id. at *8. Notably, although Justice Scalia dissented from the majority opinion, the language Justice Breyer here directly mirrors that of Justice Scalia in his concurring opinion in Gonzales v. Raich. See Gonzales
v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 37 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring) (asserting that the
proper inquiry under a Commerce Clause analysis is “whether the means
chosen are reasonably adapted to the attainment of a legitimate end under
the commerce power”) (internal quotations omitted); see also supra Notes
88–91 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Scalia’s concurrence
in Raich). Some scholar have suggested that Scalia’s dissent in Comstock
demonstrates “that he may be having second thoughts about the very
broad view of the Necessary and Proper Clause” he adopted in his concurrence in Raich, while the Comstock decision itself demonstrates that
the rest of the Court, with the exception of Justice Thomas, have accepted
the approach that Justice Scalia took in Raich. Posting of Ilya Somin to
The Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.com/ (May 17, 2010, 15:00 EST);
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Michael C. Dorf, The Supreme Court’s Decision About Sexually Dangerous Federal Prisoners: Could it Hold the Key to the Constitutionality of
the Individual Mandate to Buy Health Insurance?, FindLaw, May 19,
2010, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20100519.html.
215
Comstock, 2010 WL at *8.
216
Id.
217
Id. at *8-9.
218
Id. at *8 (internal quotations omitted).
219
Id. at *9-10.
220
Id. at *10; see 18 U.S.C. § 4246 (d) (2006).
221
Comstock, 2010 WL at *10. The Court further noted that many of the
individuals subject to § 4248 would already have been subject to § 4246.
Id.
222
Id. at *11.
223
Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 319).
224
Id.
225
Id.
226
Id. The Court noted that the Federal government “severed” the
inmates claim to “legal residence in any state” once they held them in
“remote federal prisons.” Id.
227
Id. at *11-12. See infra Part I.c for a discussion of the Tenth
Amendment and the powers reserved to the states.
228
Comstock, 2010 WL at *11.
229
Id. at *12.
230
Id.
231
Id. at *13.
232
Id.
233
Id.
234
Id. at *14-15.
235
Id. at *16 (Kennedy, J., concurring). His concern was that “rational
basis” creates different standards depending on what the Court is analyzing. Id. at *16-17. For example, Justice Kennedy demonstrated that the
“rational basis” standard is more exacting in Commerce Clause cases (citing Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005)) than it is in due process cases
(citing Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483). Id. The
former, he asserts, requires a “demonstrated link in fact” between an act
of Congress and an enumerated power, while the latter does not. Id.
236
Id. at *17.
237
Id. at *18 (Alito, J., concurring).
238
Id.
239
Id. at 19.
240
Id. at *19-20.
241
Id. at *20.
242
Id. Justice Alito reasoned that “[j]ust as it is necessary and proper for
Congress to provide for the apprehension of escaped federal prisoners, it
is necessary and proper for Congress to provide for the civil commitment
of dangerous federal prisoners who would otherwise escape civil commitment as a result of federal imprisonment.” Id.
243
Id. at 21 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
244
Id. at *22 (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,
421 (1819)).
245
Id.
246
See id. at *25. Justice Thomas criticized the Court for “put[ting]
the cart before the horse” in its opinion, as the “fit” between a statute
and its aim only matters if the end itself is legitimate. Id. Because he
believed that no enumerated power grants Congress the authority to have
individuals civilly committed, it was of no matter to Justice Thomas that
the ends and means here fit. Id.
247
Id.
248
Id. at *27. And in fact, Justice Thomas noted that this concern
was not one that was “merely hypothetical,” as almost one-fifth of the
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individuals civilly committed under § 4248 had in fact never been charged
with committing a crime that involved “sexual violence.” Id. at *27.
249
Id. at *27. In discussing this issue, Justice Thomas contrasted
this case with Greenwood , where the law at issue limited the federal
government’s authority over an individual to only when the individual was
incompetent to stand trial or the charges against him had been dropped.
Id.; see supra notes 234–243 and accompanying text for a more in-depth
discussion of Greenwood and its distinction from Comstock.
250
Comstock, 2010 WL at *27.
251
Id.
252
Id.
253
Id. at *28.
254
Id.
255
Id. at *30. Moreover, Justice Thomas emphasized that it did not
matter that states wanted the federal government to assume responsibility
here, as Congress’ power is “fixed by the constitution,” and not the
preference of the states themselves. Id. at *31.
256
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 421 (1819).
257
See supra Part I.b.
258
In fact, almost immediately following the release of the Comstock
opinion, one blogger noted that the Court has only “examined or
discussed” its McCulloch decision nine times in the past twenty years.
Constitutional Law Prof Blog, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/conlaw/
(May 18, 2010).
259
Comstock, 2010 WL at *31 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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